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These articles and associated links are provided as items of general interest and are made available for the 
purpose of peer review and discussion, as well as to promote critical thinking. This document is primarily 
produced for educational purposes for courses taught by CIWAG faculty. Selection of articles should not be 
construed as an explicit or implicit endorsement of particular publications, or the authors' or publisher's 
views or interpretations. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval 
War College, or CIWAG. The links embedded within this PDF may direct you to websites not controlled by the 
Naval War College or the Department of Defense and should not be construed as endorsement of those 
websites. Any questions should be directed to ciwag@usnwc.edu. 
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Maps 
The Sahel and North Africa 
Sahel. Bing Maps. Microsoft. June 8, 2016. Retrieved from 
https://www.bing.com/maps/?FORM=EXIPRV#Y3A9MTQuODk4NzAwfjQwLjUzMzQwMSZ
sdmw9MTMmc3R5PXImcT1TYWhlbCUyMEFmcmljYQ== 
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PART I: Armed Groups and Associated Threats/Issues 
 
Trans-Sahel  
OVERVIEW 
Trofimov, Yaroslav. “Jihad Comes To Africa.” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2016.  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/jihad-comes-to-africa-1454693025 
 
With the political map of West Africa largely one of weak and under-delivering 
postcolonial governments, militant strains of Islam have been moving to fill the vacuum, 
fostering the growth of terrorist groups seeking to gain and assert power over large 
swaths of the continent. 
BOKO HARAM 
Falode, James Adewunmi. “The Nature Of Nigeria’s Boko Haram War, 2010-2015: A Strategic  
Analysis.” Perspectives On Terrorism (Vol 10, No 1). 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/488 
 
The activities of Boko Haram in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria have highlighted the 
need for more effective counter-strategies. Nigeria’s difficulties in defeated Boko Haram 
has security ramification that go beyond its borders, especially for West Africa. This 
article applies the concepts of hybrid war, compound war, fourth generation warfare and 
unrestricted warfare to the confrontation between the Nigerian state and its Islamist 
challenger. 
 
Uhrmacher, Kevin and Mary Beth Sheridan. “The Brutal Toll Of Boko Haram’s Attacks On  
Civilians.” Washington Post, April 3, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/nigeria-boko-haram/ 
 
Several infographics detail Boko Haram’s attacks on civilians since 2011, the group’s 
evolution throughout the years, and internally displaced persons from Nigeria. 
 
Weiss, Caleb. “Over 100 Female Suicide Bombers Used In West Africa Since June 2014.” Long  
War Journal, February 3, 2016. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/02/over-
100-female-suicide-bombers-used-in-west-africa.php 
 
A map serves to illustrate the locations of bombings involving females used by Boko 
Haram since June 2014. A total of 113 female suicide bombers have been used as of May 
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13, 2016. The majority of these suicide bombings have occurred in Nigeria, however, the 
violence has spread to other countries. 
 
Searcey, Dionne. “Boko Haram Falls Victim To A Food Crisis It Created.” The New York Times,  
March 4, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/world/africa/boko-haram-food-
crisis.html 
 
Instead of burning homes and abducting hostages, Boko Haram fighters gathered 
livestock and any kind of food they could round up. After rampaging across the region 
for years, Boko Haram appears to be falling victim to a major food crisis due to 2 million 
people fleeing their homes and farms. 
 
Sreenivasan, Hari., and Nick Schifrin. “Poverty, Corruption Fuel Boko Haram in Nigeria.” PBS, 
November 29, 2015.   
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/poverty-corruption-fuels-boko-haram-in-nigeria/  
 
This video presentation and accompanying transcript looks at several of the issues that 
Nigeria is facing, and how they are impacting the population there.   Boko Haram is a 
serious threat and according to the article they have killed more people than the Islamic 
State.  In addition to the attacks of Boko Haram, Nigeria is dealing with high levels of 
corruption and widespread poverty despite growing wealth and an expanding middle 
class. There are also concerns regarding human rights issues and fair treatment of its 
citizens.      
 
“On Patrol against Boko Haram in Cameroon.” BBC, March 17, 2016. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35838112  
 
This BBC video documents the role of and challenges faced by the Cameroonian Army 
and the coalition of African countries that are fighting Boko Haram.  As the campaign 
against Boko Haram in Nigeria has seen more success, the terrorist group has expanded 
its area of attacks into neighboring countries. Success on the military front has made an 
impact, but the complete destruction of the group is difficult not only due to their remote 
bases in mountain caves but by their integration into the population. Thus, coalition 
forces have to look for threats from inside the cities and towns and in the more remote 
areas as well. 
 
Bauer, Emma and Meghan Conroy. “Boko Haram: Nigerian Military Crackdown Prompts  
Terror Group To Adapt.” Jamestown Foundation, April 15, 2016. 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45323&tx_t
tnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=374968081b2118dc24ab0c9d92d61fe2 
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The Boko Haram insurgency has shifted its tactics away from conventional warfare and 
toward more asymmetric tactics over the past year as it battles Nigerian security forces 
under the new leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari. The group’s use of children 
and women pose a more unpredictable and difficult threat for the Multinational Joint 
Task Force. 
 
Smith, Alexander. “Ansaru: Boko Haram Splinter Group Sows Terror In Nigeria.” NBC News, 
April  
10, 2016. http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-nigeria-schoolgirls/ansaru-boko-
haram-splinter-group-sows-terror-nigeria-n551661 
 
While Ansaru has been fairly quiet for the past couple of years, Nigeria’s military 
claimed in April 2016 to have captured its leader. The splinter group’s strength, 
importance, and relationship with Boko Haram are chronicled. 
 
NIGER DELTA AVENGERS 
Hinshaw, Drew and Sarah Kent, “’Niger Delta Avengers’ Sabotage Oil Output,” Wall Street 
Journal, June 5, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/niger-delta-avengers-sabotage-oil-output-
1465165361 
 
This article examines the economic impact of the Niger Delta Avengers on the Nigerian 
state. The damage has tipped Abuja toward recession and has cost its position as the 
continent’s top oil producer. Criminal groups in the Niger Delta have targeted oil 
companies for profit for several years, yet these attackers are more interested in 
undermining the Buhari administration than they are in oil revenues. NDA has sabotaged 
at least 10 separate oil installations in the past month. The article presents an overview of 
the grievances between the Niger Delta residents and the Nigerian government. 
 
Gaffey, Conor. “Who Are The Niger Delta Avengers, Nigeria’s New Oil Militants?” Newsweek, 
May  
27, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/niger-delta-avengers-niger-delta-oil-militants-
464350 
 
The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) has declared war on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure, with 
an upsurge in attacks coinciding with a dramatic fall in oil production in Africa’s biggest 
petrostate. The group’s membership is likely made up of disaffected ex-militants who 
have not benefited from the presidential amnesty program that brought the previous 
campaign of anti-oil militants to a close in 2009. 
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Doerrie, Peter. “Avengers, Assemble -- In The Niger Delta.” War Is Boring, May 17, 2016.  
https://warisboring.com/avengers-assemble-in-the-niger-delta-67c04b4b70f1#.ivbkphnad 
 
An overview of the Niger Delta’s long history of militancy is chronicled dating back to 
the early 2000s until the present day. Underwater bombings of oil pipelines, likely by 
divers, highlight the technical sophistication of the NDA’s attacks who are 
simultaneously running an extensive social media campaign against the Nigerian 
government. 
 
AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB 
Halloran, Alix and Katherine Zimmerman. “Warning from the Sahel: Al Qaeda’s Resurgent 
Threat.” AEI Critical Threats. September 2016. http://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Mali.pdf 
 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)’s objectives, close ties to al Qaeda, support 
from aggrieved populations, and ability to field and regenerate advanced attack 
capabilities are making it a potent long-term threat to Western interests. The increasing 
sophistication of AQIM’s attacks in adangerous sign that the group is gaining strength 
despite ongoing international counterterrorism operations. 
 
Zenn, Jacob. Dario Cristiani. “AQIM’s Resurgence: Responding to Islamic State.”  
Jamestown Foundation, March 3, 2016. 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45164&cH
ash=2521bec5032d67e675f7434856109ab3#.V087YLgrJ9A 
 
AQIM and its allied militant groups have undergone an operational revival since late 
2015, expanding their area of operations and mounting high-profile attacks in Burkina 
Faso and Mali. Local and regional concerns play a role in these, but a more significant 
factor is the growing rivalry with Boko Haram and ISIL’s other affiliates in Africa. 
 
Lebovich, Andrew. “The Hotel Attacks And Militant Realignment In The Sahara-Sahel  
Region.” CTC Sentinel, January 19, 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-hotel-
attacks-and-militant-realignment-in-the-sahara-sahel-region 
 
The attack on Bamako’s Radisson Blu Hotel in November 2015 shocked Mali and 
confirmed the reach of jihadist group al-Mourabitoun and the continued challenges to 
security in the region. The attack also marked the absorption of al-Mourabitoun into 
AQIM amid tests to the latter’s position from fighters who have pledged allegiance to 
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ISIL. AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operations outside of their traditional 
stronghold in Mali, a trend that will likely continue in 2016. 
 
Carter, Phillip and Michael W. Baca. “Beyond Grand Bassam: Terrorism On The West  
African Coast.” War On The Rocks, May 2, 2016. 
http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/beyond-grand-bassam-terrorism-on-the-west-african-
coast/ 
 
AQIM has shifted their lethal focus to hotels frequented by tourists and Western 
expatriates. Any successful counterterrorism strategy must consider local governance, 
economic opportunity, and regional intelligence sharing, as the threat of terrorism 
becomes the new normal for littoral West Africa. 
 
Doerrie, Peter. “Al Qaeda Is Spreading Across West Africa.” War Is Boring, March 21,  
2016. https://warisboring.com/al-qaeda-is-spreading-across-west-africa-97b00ed6aac 
 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is the official franchise in the region, but it tolerates the 
existence of several other semi-autonomous terror groups within its sphere of influence -- 
and in some cases it purportedly facilitated their creation. AQIM and its affiliates have 
conducted high-profile attacks outside Mali in the face of French counterterrorism efforts 
in the Trans-Sahel. 
 
Weiss, Caleb. “Jihadists Strike Across Northern Mali,” Long War Journal, April 13, 2016.  
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/04/jihadists-strike-across-northern-
mali.php 
 
This article presents an interactive map illustrating approximate locations of al Qaeda-
linked attacks in Mali and neighboring countries since 2014. Included are IED attacks, 
rocket attacks, suicide bombings, attacks, and “other”. IED attacks in the northern 
corridor continued through 2016 in addition to being utilized in the south-central. The 
number of rocket attacks increased in 2015 to regions not targeted the year prior, 
however AQIM’s primary targets continued to be in the north. The number of attacks 
with small arms / light weapons spread central, south, west, and cross-border against 
villagers and government targets. 
 
“Al Qaeda linked to more than 205 West African attacks in 2016.” Long War Journal. January 7, 
2017. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/01/over-250-al-qaeda-linked-attacks-in-
west-africa-in-2016.php 
 
Al Qaeda and its many allies and affiliates launched at least 257 attacks in Mali and the 
wider West African region in 2016, nearly a staggering 150% uptick from the group’s 
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106 assaults in the 2015 calendar year. The large number of attacks also represents a 
resurgent al Qaeda-led insurgency in northern Mali, which has been able to penetrate into 
southern Mali with greater frequency than in previous years. 
 
“Mali Hotel Attack: Three Days of National Mourning Begin.” BBC, November 23, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34897745 
 
This article discusses the Radisson Blu hotel siege in Mali. Mali has announced 3 days of 
national mourning after gunmen stormed the Radisson Blu hotel and took guests hostage, 
killing up to 27 people. Malian and international troops stormed the hotel in order to free 
the guests. So far, three different groups claimed responsibility for the attacks. 
 
Essoo, Gaelle and Laura Burloux. “Video: Hunting Down Jihadists In The Malian Desert.” 
France 24,  
April 13, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160413-focus-mali-french-army-
operation-barkhane-sahel-jihadists-landmines 
 
More than 3,000 French troops remain on the ground and have managed to drive jihadist 
groups out of some zones, but they and their Malian counterparts lack the manpower to 
control the whole desert. 
 
Northern Africa  
OVERVIEW 
Gall, Carlotta. “Jihadists Deepen Collaboration In North Africa.” The New York Times, January 
1, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/02/world/africa/jihadists-deepen-
collaboration-in-north-africa.html 
 
Al Qaeda affiliates are experiencing increasing competition with ISIL franchises as 
jihadists reach deeper into Africa. Analysts fear this will push local jihadist groups to 
coalesce into pan-regional threats. France has 3,500 troops across five countries in the 
Sahel to exert pressure on jihadist communication and supply lines. 
 
Boghani, Priyanka. “Where the Black flag of ISIS Flies: A Look at the Nine Countries where the 
Terror Group has Formal Affiliates.” PBS Frontline, May 13, 2016.  
 http://apps.frontline.org/isis-affiliates/  
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There were six attacks by ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula, mostly directed at security 
checkpoints army and police positions. There was also an attack on the Swiss-Inn hotel in 
el-Arish and the downing of the Russian passenger jet in October, 2015.  
ISIS in Libya  have attacked military checkpoints, hotels, embassies, military training 
camps, and towns.  They have expanded their presence in Libya.  
 
WEAPONS 
“Investigating Cross-Border Weapon Transfers in the Sahel.” Conflict Armament Research. 
November 2016. https://goo.gl/Ws5ziQ 
 
This report is the product of field investigations conducted over ten months, in eight 
countries, to reveal sources of weapons for armed groups and Islamist fighters across 
North and West Africa. It identifies a network of Sahelian trafficking routes stretching as 
far afield as Syria, Mali, and Ivory Coast. 
LIBYA 
OVERVIEW OF MILITIAS 
“Guide To Key Libyan Militas.” BBC, January 11, 2016. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-   19744533 
 
With nearly 2,000 militias operating in Libya, this article offers a primer on the non-
jihadist groups (i.e. Libya Dawn, Libya Shield); jihadist groups (IS, Ansar al-Sharia); and 
pro-government groups of the internationally-recognized authorities (Libyan National 
Army; Zintan, al-Sawaig, al-Qaqa brigades), including anti-Islamist militias. 
 
“Profile: Libya’s military strongman Khalifa Haftar.” BBC, April 22, 2016.  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27492354 
 
A former high-ranking officer in Gaddafi’s military, Haftar returned to Libya in 2011 
where he became a key commander of the makeshift rebel force in the east. He called on 
Libyans to rise up against the elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), 
after it failed to confront the Islamists. In May 2014 Gen Haftar launched Operation 
Dignity against Islamist militants in Benghazi and the east. In March 2015 Libya’s 
elected parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR) – which had replaced the GNC – 
appointed him commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Although successful in 
pushing the Islamist militants out of much of Benghazi, Haftar still opposes the UN-
brokered Government of National Accord (GNA). 
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“Libya’s Tripoli government to step down.” BBC, April 5, 2016.  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35974641 
 
A justice ministry statement announced that the Tripoli-based administration would stand 
down to prevent further bloodshed, less than a week after the arrival in Tripoli of a UN-
backed national unity government. The Tobruk-based administration, formed by the 
House of Representatives, still opposes the UN-backed body. 
 
Ali Zway, Suliman, Kareem Fahim, and Eric Schmitt. “In Libya, U.S. Courts Unreliable Allies  
To Counter ISIS,” New York Times, January 18, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/world/middleeast/in-libya-us-courts-unreliable-
allies-to-counter-isis.html 
 
The U.S. and its allies have been forced to court unreliable allies from among a 
patchwork of Libyan militias that remain unaccountable, poorly organized, and divded by 
region and tribe. Three groups: the Libyan National Army, Zintans, and Misuratis are 
profiled in this article. 
 
Kilani, Feras. “Benghazi in Crisis.” PBS Frontline. May 3, 2016.  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/benghazi-in-crisis/  
 
This shows the logistics shortages and the difficulties in coordinating between the anti-
ISIS militias (The Benghazi anti-Terrorism Unit) and the Libyan military. ISIS has a 
solid foothold in Benghazi and the regular army and militias are fighting to remove them.  
Yet the inefficient communications and coordination, lack of ammunition and outdated 
weapons greatly hinder the ability of the militias. The militias believe that unity between 
the various anti-ISIS forces and better equipment would allow them to retake the district 
from ISIS and then move on to other districts. The commander of the militia force argues 
that ISIS is not only better equipped but has better training and tactics, if they are not 
checked in Libya they will spread to Egypt, Tunisia and other parts of Africa, following 
that he believes it will spread to Italy and other parts of Europe.  It also shows how the 
inhabitants have learned to try to go about their lives in the midst of the fighting. 
 
ROLE OF GEOGRAPHY 
McGregor, Andrew. “The Strategic Topography of Southern Libya.” CTC Sentinel, May 25,  
2016.  https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-strategic-topography-of-southern-libya 
 
If the security situation in Libya deteriorates, any foreign intervention into IS’ 
strongholds in the north would likely have unforeseen consequences for southern Libya, a 
strategically vital region that supplies most of the country’s water and electricity. 
Militants could react by targeting this infrastructure or fleeing southward, destabilizing 
11 
 
the region. An overview of the tribal situation and strategic sites in southern Libya are 
presented in this article. 
 
IS AFFILIATES AND STRATEGY IN LIBYA 
“The Islamic State’s Expansion Strategy In Libya,” Soufan Group, March 3, 2016.  
http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-states-expansion-strategy-in-libya/ 
 
To ensure its economic sustainability, IS has attempted to capture energy infrastructure in 
the east, in addition to spreading south and west into the remote desert regions to secure 
access to lucrative smuggling routes running through the vast Sahara desert. In addition 
to drawing foreign terrorist fighters to its Libyan stronghold, IS also pressures defectors 
from Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) and splinter affiliates of al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) to join its Libyan franchises. 
 
Rahmani, Bardia and Andrea Tanco. “ISIS’s Growing Caliphate: Profile of Affiliates.” Wilson  
Center, February 19, 2016. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isiss-growing-caliphate-
profiles-affiliates 
 
This article offers a primer on Libya’s IS affiliates including their strength, reach, notable 
attacks, and essential background information. 
 
Estelle, Emily. “ISIS’s Courses of Action – Out of Sirte.” AEI Critical Threats, April 29, 2016.  
http://www.criticalthreats.org/libya/estelle-isis-courses-of-action-out-of-sirte-april-29-
2016 
 
IS is laying the groundwork to abandon Sirte and will then pursue an alternative course of 
action to continue its campaign in North Africa without its Libyan stronghold. IS will 
most likely seek to build a safe haven in southwestern Libya, but it also has the 
dangerous option to escalate its campaign in neighboring Tunisia. 
 
Colquhoun, Cameron. “Tip Of The Spear? Meet ISIS’ Special Operations Unit, Katibat al- 
Battar.” Bellingcat, February 16, 2016. 
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/02/16/tip-of-the-spear-meet-isis-special-
operations-unit-katibat-al-battar/ 
 
A little-known group of battle-hardened and highly capable Libyans are the common 
factor behind many of the major terrorist attacks in Europe and North Africa since 2014, 
including the Paris attacks last November. 
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EGYPT 
Avi Asher-Schapiro. “Islamic State vs. Revolutionary Punishment: Terror Groups Vie to Claim 
Egypt Bombing.” Vice, January 22, 2016. https://news.vice.com/article/islamic-state-vs-
revolutionary-punishment-terror-groups-vie-to-claim-egypt-bombing 
 
 ISIL and another militant group known as Revolutionary Punishment have both claimed 
responsibility for an attack that killed a group of police officers, illustrating how 
mainland Egypt has become a hotbed of militant activity. Meanwhile, the government 
laid blame on the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
Muhammad Mansour. “The Islamic State’s Targeting Strategy in Egypt.” Jamestown 
Foundation, February 4, 2016. 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45066&cH
ash=b67b4b93470f30f6b77716bd74927d7f 
 
 Attacks by ISIL in Egypt show two clear trends: attacks on the security services and 
targeting of tourists and the tourism industry. Terrorism in the country is rising despite 
intensive counter-insurgency campaigns, while the government simultaneously panics 
from the seeds of social movements planted by the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011. 
 
Mokhtar Awad. “The Islamic State’s Pyramid Scheme: Egyptian Expansion and the Giza 
Governorate Cell.” Combating Terrorism Center, April 22, 2016. 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-islamic-states-pyramid-scheme-egyptian-expansion-
and-the-giza-governorate-cell 
 
 ISIL is taking steps to destabilize mainland Egypt by steadily making inroads. ISIL has 
struggled in advancing its Egypt agenda but recent trends indicate ISIL could consolidate 
mainland militants’ efforts and escalate insurgency in the future by providing the 
training, weapons, and leadership. 
 
Hanna, Jason, Michael Martinez, and Jennifer Deaton. “ISIS Published Photo of What It Says is 
Bomb That Downed Russian Plane.” CNN, November 19, 2015. 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/18/middleeast/metrojet-crash-dabiq-claim/ 
 
 Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 crashed over the Sinai Peninsula late October after a bomb 
was placed on board allegedly by ISIL. The bomb killed all 224 people on board. 
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TUNISIA 
“The Islamic State’s Tunisia Strategy.” The Soufan Group, March 8, 2016.  
http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-states-tunisia-strategy/ 
 
There have been an increase in infiltrations from Libya into Tunisia after a U.S. airstrike 
on an ISIL training camp outside the Libyan city of Sabratha, near the Tunisian border. 
From its positions in Libya, ISIL will likely continue to utilize its large contingent of 
Tunisian fighters to carry out attacks intended to undermine Tunisian stability. 
 
Markey, Patrick and Tarek Amara. “As Fighters Return From Libya, Tunisia Faces Growing 
Challenge.” AOL News / Reuters, May 24, 2016. 
http://www.aol.com/article/2016/05/24/as-fighters-return-from-libya-tunisia-faces-
growing-challenge/21382862/ 
 
 Dozens of ISIL fighters from Libya snuck into Tunisia and attacked an army barracks and 
police bases in the town of Ben Guerdane, further indicating the how Libya’s chaos has 
spilled over into its neighbor. Between 4,000-6,000 Tunisians have left to fight for ISIL 
in Syria, Iraq, and Libya are now beginning to return to the country to carry out attacks 
on their homeland, including attacks on a beach hotel and a museum security forces 
believed were carried out by Tunisian gunmen who trained in Libya.  
 
AFRICOM Update 
 
Official Website for United States African Command (AFRICOM): http://www.africom.mil/  
 
The official website of AFRICOM provides updates on their mission statement, 
operations, and coordination with local partner nations.  
 
“Rodriguez: African an ‘Enduring Interest for the United States.’” U.S. Africa Command Public 
Affairs, March 8, 2016. 
http://www.africom.mil/NewsByCategory/article/28037/rodriguez-africa-an-enduring-
interest-for-the-united-states  
 
This summary with some selected quotes lays out the key points of the 2016 AFRICOM 
Posture Statement by General David M. Rodriguez.  In the statement, Gen. Rodriguez 
describes the growing economy, population and influence of Africa and how it is 
important that the U.S. to assist with the security of the continent. The overall lack of 
democratic governments and limited employment options are both factors in the rise of 
violent extremists in Africa. Gen. Rodriguez provides an overview of the current situation 
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and threats in the different regions of Africa.  In particular to Libya, its lack of a central 
government and uncontrolled borders provide an environment for violent extremists to 
expand, especially Islamic State-Libya (IS-Libya). In Western Africa, Boko Haram 
continues to be the main threat.  He continues by praising the role of the different 
multinational coalitions involved in combatting violent extremists in Africa.  Other 
concerns include the destabilizing roles of China and Russia, in regards to China’s 
resource harvesting and both China and Russia selling weapons on the continent.               
 
 
PART II: Role of China in Africa: Involvement, Economic Strategy 
and Investments 
 
Involvement 
Winsor, Morgan. “With China’s Naval Base, Djibouti Could Become ‘Africa’s Singapore’.” 
International Business Times, February 4, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-naval-base-
djibouti-could-become-africas-singapore-2292581 
 
Some 4,800 miles from Beijing, China is constructing its newest naval base in Djibouti, 
giving the Asian nation its first overseas military outpost. This will grant Beijing access 
to the Arabian Peninsula and allow it to project force near its investments in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
“Chinese Investment In Africa: Not As Easy As It Looks.” The Economist, November 21, 2015.  
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21678777-western-worries-about-
chinas-burgeoning-influence-africa-may-be-overblown-not 
 
There is growing evidence that some Chinese firms that leap into Africa are struggling with the 
same problems Africa has long given Western investors, despite significant investment in 
airports, copper mines, oil rigs, and civic infrastructure.  Chinese firms experience difficulties in 
dealing with the national and local governments as the latter sometimes refuse to honor the 
international agreements of the former. However, the total stock of Chinese investments grew 
twenty-fold between 2005 and 2014, from $3.2bn to $32bn, according to the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce. 
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Economic Strategy 
 
Postel, Hannah. “Following the Money: Chinese Labor Migration to Zambia.” Migration Policy 
Institute, February 20, 2015. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/following-money-
chinese-labor-migration-zambia  
Though not in the Trans-Sahel region, China has played a serious role in infrastructure 
construction and copper mining in Zambia in particular. Starting in 2008, with the 
building of the TAZARA Railway and the “Special Economic Zone” in Zambia, China 
has invested close to 11% of Zambian total GDP of $26.8 billion.  It is mostly in 
construction, infrastructure, manufacturing, and copper mining. In addition to its role in 
infrastructure, China in 2014 began funding Mandarin instruction in Zambian 
government secondary schools.     
 
“China in Africa: One among many.” The Economist, January 17, 2015. 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21639554-china-has-become-
big-africa-now-backlash-one-among-many  
 
China has become Africa’s biggest trade partner, as of 2015 exchanging $160 billion in 
good a year and up to one million Chinese workers moving to Africa.  However, India is 
fast catching up with goods exchanges set to reach $100 billion this year.  
 
Investments 
Bradsher, Keith and Adam Nossiter. “In Nigeria, Chinese Investment Comes With a Downside.” 
The  
New York Times, December 5, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/business/international/in-nigeria-chinese-
investment-comes-with-a-downside.html?_r=0 
 
China’s investment in Nigeria is having significant economic, political, and social 
ramifications that are creating a fertile recruiting ground for terror groups like Boko 
Haram. Chinese-funded infrastructure projects rely on construction materials imported 
from China rather than local firms, while Chinese trade theft of Nigerian textile designs 
has led to a thirty-fold Nigerian job loss in that sector over the past twenty years. 
 
Johnson, Steve. “China By Far The Largest Investor In African Infrastructure.” Financial Times,  
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November 20, 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/716545c0-9529-11e5-ac15-
0f7f7945adba.html 
 
Chinese institutions are already the largest single source of funds for African 
infrastructure, accounting for $13.4bn in 2013, with state-run development finances 
accounting for 80 per cent of the funding in Africa.  
 
PART III: Populations Trends and Immigration 
 
Nigeria Population Trends  
 
“UNICEF Nigeria.” UNICEF,  
http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/Countries_1320.html 
 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populated country and with an estimated 130 million inhabitants, 
one in every five Africans is a Nigerian.  
 
“Global Population Forecast..” The Economist, August 4, 2015. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/08/daily-chart-growth-areas 
 
Population forecasts from the United Nations point to a new world order in 2050. The 
number of people will grow from 7.3 billion to 9.7 billion in 2050, 100m more than was 
estimated in the UN's last report two years ago. More than half of this growth comes from 
Africa, where the population is set to double to 2.5 billion. Nigeria's population will reach 
413m, overtaking America as the world's third most-populous country. Congo and 
Ethiopia will swell to more than 195m and 188m repectively, more than twice their 
current numbers. India will surpass China as the world's most populous country in 2022, 
six years earlier than was previously forecast. 
 
“How will a Population Boom Change Africa.” BBC, September 11, 2005. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34188248 
 
The United Nations estimates that Africa's population will double to 2.5 billion by 2050. 
About 400 million of these people will live in Nigeria alone. 
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Refugee and Migrant Trends 
Pogatchnik, Shawn. “Libyan Smuggling Route Grows 1 Year After Mass Drownings.” 
Associated Press, April 17, 2016. 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/03c3f57f911645cb8e355ac051e79c20/libyan-smuggling-
route-grows-1-year-after-mass-drownings 
 
One year after Europe’s deadliest migrant disaster, humanitarian and security efforts off 
the lawless coast of Libya face a growing challenge to catch smugglers and bring asylum-
seekers to safety. However, crackdowns on migration at other EU borders are increasing 
the traffic at the southern Mediterranean crossing. Libya’s paramilitary chaos may make 
the North African nation a particularly attractive launching point for Europe-bound 
migrants. 
 
Destrijcker, Lucas. “Welcome to Agadez, Smuggling Capital of Africa.” Politico. October 17, 
2016. http://www.politico.eu/article/the-smuggling-capital-of-africa-agadez-niger/ 
 
From Agadez in central Niger, hundreds of thousands attempt to cross the Sahara and 
reach Europe. But more die in the desert crossing than do in the Mediterranean and many 
are kidnapped by traffickers or bandits and subjected to physical or sexual abuse in the 
process. 
